For the first three decades of my life, I lived, like everyone else on Earth at the time, under the nuclear sword of Damocles. As a kid, I can remember beginning each new school year practicing “duck and cover” drills, diving under our desks hoping against hope that by doing so, we’d protect ourselves from the ominous cloud of horror that everyone and everything we knew was about to be obliterated by a nuclear attack.Then something unimaginable happened in a small white house on the edge of the North Atlantic that would change the course of history.In October 1986, President Reagan met Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, to resolve the question of whether we were destined for nuclear war or if we could step back from the brink. At a moment when 70,000 nuclear weapons existed throughout the world, these two fierce adversaries sat down across from each other and looked past decades of fear and suspicion to find a middle ground.I play Ronald Reagan in a new film set during that extraordinary weekend. The story of their meeting is a testament to the power of diplomacy and to what is possible when two sides come together in the name of mutual interest and peace. Thanks to their courage to engage in conversation, the United States and Russia reduced nuclear weapons by 80% over the following decade. That weekend marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War.A film like ours can play a significant role in helping the public understand the stakes of the nuclear arms race and what would happen if, God forbid, nuclear weapons suddenly filled our skies. I hope Reagan would admire our new film in part because not only did he understand the power of cinema as an actor, but he shifted his own views on whether nuclear war was winnable after watching the ABC film “The Day After” a few weeks before its 1983 premiere while he was at Camp David.I may have disagreed with some of what Reagan believed, but I deeply respect him for having the strength to engage directly and in good faith with our greatest adversary. He bucked domestic business pressure and policy hawks, and in doing so he showed the world that strong leaders pursue dialogue.Forty years later, that lesson is more important than ever.The last arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia — a legacy of Reykjavik — expired earlier this year. Today, we are facing a new, three-way arms race with Russia and China. In addition, numerous other countries have developed or are seeking nuclear technology with a de-emphasis on inspections. Countries that swore off the bomb — from Poland to South Korea — may be reconsidering.Nuclear weapons in today’s arsenals are up to 80 times more powerful than the bomb the U.S. dropped on Hiroshima. Many are still poised to launch at a moment’s notice. New technologies from artificial intelligence to hypersonic missiles make the situation even more complicated than it was during the Cold War.There have been many close calls and misinterpretations that nearly ended in nuclear catastrophe because of a lack of communication and dialogue. In 1983 — just two weeks before 100 million Americans watched “The Day After” — NATO conducted a military drill that took place over several days called “Able Archer,” which simulated the start of a nuclear war. The exercise took place during heightened U.S.–Soviet tensions, just after the deployment of missiles capable of reaching Moscow in eight minutes. The Soviets readied for nuclear war fearing it was cover for an attack.We’re not immune from this happening again. Just last year, the U.S. and Russia traded escalatory comments about repositioning nuclear-armed submarines. Without an open channel of communication, we risk misinterpreting intentions and actions — and the consequences could kill millions.To avert disaster, we must start talking to one another. Dialogue is not weakness. It does not mean agreement, endorsement or surrender. Rather, it is a safeguard for our future, the first step in finding a path forward that will make this planet we share safer for all of us.As the former president said: “A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought.”Jeff Daniels portrays Ronald Reagan in the new film “The Brink of War.” Insights L.A. Times Insights delivers AI-generated analysis on Voices content to offer all points of view. Insights does not appear on any news articles. Viewpoint This article generally aligns with a Center point of view. Learn more about this AI-generated analysis Perspectives The following AI-generated content is powered by Perplexity. The Los Angeles Times editorial staff does not create or edit the content. Ideas expressed in the pieceThe article argues that Reagan’s 1986 Reykjavik summit with Mikhail Gorbachev showed how direct, good-faith dialogue between adversaries can radically reduce nuclear dangers, emphasizing that this meeting helped pave the way for major cuts in U.S. and Soviet arsenals and marked a turning point in the Cold War[1][9].Building on this historical lens, the piece suggests that Reykjavik’s legacy demonstrates the power of leaders who are willing to challenge hawkish advisers and domestic pressure in order to prioritize mutual restraint, arms control, and the shared recognition that nuclear war is unwinnable and must never be fought[1][9].The article contends that cultural works like the ABC film “The Day After” and the new film about Reykjavik can play a crucial role in shaping public understanding of nuclear war’s human costs, and argues that Reagan’s own shift in thinking illustrates how exposure to vivid depictions of nuclear catastrophe can move even hardened policymakers toward arms reduction.Extending this argument to the present, the piece warns that the expiration of the last major U.S.-Russia strategic arms control treaty has removed a key guardrail at the very moment a three-way nuclear competition among the United States, Russia, and China is taking shape, a concern echoed by analysts who describe the collapse of the New START framework and the rise of a “two-peer” or “three-body” nuclear problem[2][7][10].The article further argues that today’s nuclear risks are even more complex than during the Cold War, citing more powerful warheads, weapons kept on high alert, and emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and hypersonic missiles that can compress decision times and magnify the danger of miscalculation, concerns that parallel expert warnings about new threats to nuclear command-and-control systems and strategic stability[2][3][10].The piece stresses that history is filled with near-misses caused by misinterpretation and poor communication, using the 1983 NATO Able Archer exercise as a cautionary tale and drawing a line from such episodes to current escalatory rhetoric over nuclear deployments, while underscoring expert assessments that modern crises could again be inflamed by misread signals in the absence of reliable hotlines and transparency measures[2][3][6].In light of these risks, the article maintains that reopening channels of dialogue with adversaries is not weakness but a necessary safeguard, arguing that talking does not imply endorsement or concession but is instead the first step toward risk reduction, arms control, and confidence-building—a view shared by many arms control specialists who urge renewed strategic stability talks and creative frameworks for managing nuclear competition[3][5][7].Different views on the topicIn contrast to the article’s heavy emphasis on dialogue, some analysts argue that current conditions differ sharply from the late Cold War and that relying on Reykjavik as a template risks underplaying the need for stronger deterrence; they contend that in a world of two nuclear peers, Russia and China, the United States must prioritize modernizing its forces and integrating nuclear planning with broader competition strategy rather than assuming diplomacy alone can stabilize the system[3][7].Additionally, some policy reports caution against “putting all eggs in the dialogue basket,” arguing that while engagement and arms control should be pursued, they must be backed by credible military capabilities and a willingness to compete in the nuclear domain to prevent adversaries from exploiting perceived U.S. restraint[3][6].Other commentators emphasize that the primary problem is not a lack of U.S. willingness to talk but the reluctance or obstruction of Moscow and Beijing, noting that Russia has rejected new arms control proposals and leaned on nuclear threats, while China has resisted joining trilateral talks and insists Washington and Moscow reduce first—developments that, in this view, limit the relevance of Reykjavik-style breakthroughs for today’s multipolar context[4][5][11].Some strategists argue that, given the expiration of New START and dim prospects for a near-term successor, Washington must first ensure a robust nuclear command, control, and communications system and maintain sufficient survivable forces to deter both Russia and China simultaneously, suggesting that technical resilience and force posture may provide more immediate stability than aspirational disarmament goals[7][10].A different line of critique comes from experts who see arms control with China as especially unlikely in the foreseeable future, given Beijing’s ongoing buildup and past rejection of limits; these voices argue that U.S. planners should not assume comprehensive trilateral reductions are realistic and instead focus on “optimal deterrence” concepts, including continued modernization and revised targeting doctrines, even if that complicates the disarmament narrative celebrated by the article[8][12].Finally, some analysts warn that overemphasizing the moral symbolism of Reykjavik can obscure how hard-edged bargaining, alliance cohesion, and economic and military pressure contributed to past arms agreements; these perspectives argue that any future dialogue with Russia and China must be grounded in leverage rather than nostalgia, and that Western states should avoid allowing nuclear coercion or “nuclear blackmail” to dictate diplomatic agendas[6][7].
